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I. INTRODUCTION 
Observers may be struck by the remarkable coincidence that the Statue of Liberty 
and U.S. immigration law are simultaneously undergoing renovation. Both have failed to 
weather the years and are showing the stress of time. The Senate passed its version 1 of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (better known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill) on May 
18, 1983, and the House of Representatives passed its version2 on June 20, 1984. The 
House and Senate conferees met in September 1984 to attempt to iron out differences 
between the two measures,3 hopeful that they would complete the task before the sched-
uled adjournment of Congress on October 5. Unfortunately, the factious conferees were 
unsuccessful, and immigration reform has eluded the 98th Congress. 
If some version of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill becomes law under the 98th Congress, it 
will be the most significant reformation of U.S. immigration law and policy in more than 
three decades. When the venerable Lady again holds her lamp before the "Golden Door," 
the inscription4 at her feet may no longer represent America's de facto immigration policy. 
* Attorney at law, Henderson, Daily, Withrow & DeVoe, Indianapolis, Indiana. I wish to 
express my deepest appreciation to Philip J. Ripani, Kelly J. Dugger, G. Bryan Miller, and Nancy K. 
Hofstetter for their research assistance and astute editorial comments. Special thanks to Rep. Dan 
Burton (R-Ind.) for the assistance of his staff in locating legislative materials of recent vintage. 
1 S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as S. 529]. 
2 H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 1510]. 
3 Cohadas, Conferees Begin Work on Immigration Bill, 42 CONGo Q. 2275 (1984). 
4 The New Colossus, a poem by Emma Lazarus, was inscribed on the Statue's pedestal in 1903. It 
reads: 
Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame, / With conquering limbs astride from land to 
land; / Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand / A mighty woman with a 
torch, whose flame / Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name Mother of Exiles. / 
From her beacon-hand / Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command / The 
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This article will examine the Third World population growth which has led to a 
massive increase in immigration to the United States, briefly summarize America's historic 
legislative response to immigration, and discuss the means by which legislative revisions 
may deal with current issues and problems. 
II. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
A. The Malthusian Theory of Population Stabilization 
Throughout almost all of recorded history, human population growth has been 
either stable or very slowly increasing. At the time of Christ, world population stood at a 
mere 300,000,000,5 and it took more than 1500 years thereafter to double. 6 Pre-industrial 
societies were characterized by birth and death rates which seem appallingly high by 
modern standards. 7 The balance of births over deaths always remained tenuous, but 
(much to man's credit) births generally prevailed. 
In the 18th century, Thomas Malthus observed that man increases his numbers 
"geometrically" (2,4, 8, 16, and so forth), while his means of subsistence increases only 
"arithmetically" (l, 2, 3, 4, and so forth).8 Because man's reproductive ability exceeded his 
ability to produce food, Malthus reasoned that population growth would eventually be 
checked by the scarcity of subsistence. Man, therefore, was destined to inhabit a world of 
scarcity.9 
Indeed, it appears that pre-industrial populations were prevented from growing 
rapidly by virtue of a number of "Malthusian" checks. Although pre-industrial peoples 
seldom starved, they did die in unusually large numbers from diseases, particularly when 
susceptibility to disease was great as a result of poor nutrition. lO In addition, periodic bad 
harvests tended to delay marriages, also reducing the birth rate." By any measure, those 
were lean times. 
B. European Population Growth and Stabilization 
During the eighteenth century the population of northern and western Europe 
began a steady growth which continued well into the twentieth century. This continued 
rise in population was due to a combination of events, beginning with the so-called "vital 
revolution" and culminating in the industrial revolution. 12 As the industrial revolution 
spread from England eastward, the populations of southern and eastern Europe began to 
increase as well. Technological advancements led to a steady increase in the quantity and 
air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame. / "Keep ancient lands, your storied pomp!" 
cries she / With silent lips. "Give me your tired, your poor, / Your huddled masses 
yearning to breathe free, / The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. / Send these, 
the homeless, tempest-tost to me, / I lift my lamp beside the golden door!" 
5 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1984, at 2 [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT]' 
6 Id. 
7 See generally, W. BORRIE, GROWTH AND CONTROL OF WORLD POPULATION (1970). 
8 T. MALTHUS, FIRST ESSAY ON POPULATION (J. Bonar ed. 1966). 
9 Malthus' grim prediction led to the characterization of economics as "the dismal science." See, 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 7-10. 
lO WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 58. 
1l [d. 
12 [d. at 60-61. 
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quality of food produced. I3 Europeans also acquired a basic understanding of sanitation 
and disease transmission, leading to a gradual decline in the death rate. 14 The populations 
of northern and western Europe (followed by the populations of eastern and southern 
Europe) entered a stage of demographic transition characterized by high "pre-industrial" 
birth rates, low "industrial" death rates and, consequently, rapid growth. 15 
The technological changes which fostered this demographic growth were largely 
confined to the European continent until the early twentieth century. It is no surprise, 
then, that the nineteenth century is perceived as the heyday of European civilization. 
During that time, Europeans spread across the face of the globe,'6 colonizing the Amer-
icas, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, and bringing most of what remained 
under their political domination. It is no mere coincidence that the nineteenth century 
was also the period of greatest European migration to the United StatesY 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the growth rate of Euro-
pean populations began to decline. IB For a variety of reasons, families began to voluntarily 
limit births. 19 European populations eventually stabilized at levels which were comfortably 
distant from the limits of subsistence, permitting an unparalleled standard of living.20 
Europeans completed the transition to demographic stability via low birth and death 
rates. 
The prospect of man avoiding "Malthusian" consequences by curtailing his own 
power to reproduce was not anticipated by Malthus, and has led modern scholars to treat 
him with justifiable skepticism. The voluntary reduction in the number of births is the 
result of a host of factors which are present today in societies which we typically describe 
as economically "deveioped."21 As European populations stabilized, European immigra-
tion to the United States declined, first from the northwestern European countries, and 
finally from the southern and eastern European countries.22 
C. Third World Population Growth 
Twenty years ago, Arnold Toynbee said: 
Our age will be well remembered not for its horrifying crimes nor its astonish-
13 [d. 
14 [d. at 63. 
15 [d. 
16 W. BORRIE, supra note 7, at 98. Some 51 million people left Europe between 1846 and 1939. 
17 See infra figure 1. American folklore suggests that Europeans arrived in America to avoid 
religious and political persecution and to seek economic opportunity. Indeed, individuals migrated 
for a variety of personal reasons. Nevertheless, it was demographic growth which fueled and 
sustained such migrations. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17. 
18 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 61. 
19 This trend toward fewer births preceded the widespread use of artificial contraceptives. 
There is no question that artificial contraceptives simplify family planning efforts, but the availability 
of such contraceptives does not, by itself, reduce the number of births significantly. Demographers 
recognize that families respond to economic incentives to reduce the number of births, and that such 
incentives are present in economically developed countries. Urbanization, literacy (particularly 
among women), longer life expectancy, and the "opportunity cost'· of a mother's time have been 
identified as factors which contribute to fewer births. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 5, 
at 51-53. Consequently, population planners in the Third World are wisely focusing on incentives 
which affect fertility, rather than merely providing access to artificial contraceptives. [d. at 106-26. 
20 [d. at 61. 
21 [d. at 51-53. 
22 [d. at 62 (box 4.3). 
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ing inventions, but because it is the first generation since the dawn of history 
in which mankind dared to believe it practical to make the benefits of civiliza-
tion available to the whole human race.'3 
One of the consequences of European colonization and colonial domination has been the 
dissemination of medical knowledge and technical know-how throughout much of the 
world. Great strides have been made in reducing the mortality rate in Third World 
countries through the eradication of many diseases, the introduction of modern medi-
cine, and improvements in diet, sanitation, and education.'4 Agricultural productivity has 
been increased with the assistance of artificial fertilizers, pesticides, and genetically altered 
grains.'5 As a consequence, death rates in most non-European areas of the world have 
dropped dramatically during the twentieth century.'6 Birth rates, however, have re-
mained at high pre-industrial levels.'7 The result is a staggering explosion in human 
population in the Third World." 
In the thirty-five years following 1950, world population has doubled.'9 This increase 
has been largely confined to so-called "developing" countries.30 Mexico, for example, will 
increase its population eight-fold during this century alone.3! The increase attributable 
solely to the Third World during the last quarter of this century will exceed the total 
population of the globe at the beginning of this century.3' 
This Third World transitional growth differs from the earlier period of European 
growth in a number of very important respects. The decline in the Third World's death 
rate has occurred at a comparatively earlier stage of economic development than that 
which occurred in Europe, contributing to an unparalleled increase in the world's poor.33 
Also, the rate of increase is far more rapid in the Third World today than it was in 
Europe,34 which itself inhibits economic development.35 Finally, the solution of out-
migration, which served as a demographic escape valve for Europe, is today a less viable 
option.36 
It would of course be a mistake to regard the non-European world as a monolithic 
economic unit. A number of non-European countries have reached, or seem to be 
approaching, demographic stability via economic development. Most notably, Japan has 
23 Quoted by A. W. Clausen in his address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank and 
International Finance Corporation, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 24, 1984). 
24 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 63. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 /d. 
2S According to the World Bank, "[t]he post World War II rate of population growth in 
developing countries is without precedent." Id. 
29 Id. at 7. 
30 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: ILLUSTRA-
TIVE PROJECTIONS OF WORLD POPULATIONS TO THE 21ST CENTURY, Special Studies Ser. P. 23179 at 2 
(1979). 
31 Hofstetter, Economic Underdevelopment and the Population Explosion: Implications for u.s. Immig-
ration Policy, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 55, 63-64 (R. Hofstetter ed. 1984). 
32 Id. at 56. 
33 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, WORLD POPULATION 1979 - RECENT 
DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES FOR COUNTRIES AND REGIONS OF THE WORLD, Table I (1980). 
34 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 58-63. 
35 See infra note 37. 
36 Those areas not experiencing rapid population growth are, for the most part, already 
developed, and are not inhabited by easily subjugated peoples. 
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completed its demographic transition and is today a non-European country of consider-
able economic importance. Many nations in eastern Asia - South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Singapore in particular - seem to be following japan's lead. For such countries, demog-
raphic stability and European-style consumption patterns are a reasonable, even likely, 
prospect. Other countries, particularly those located in sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia, are finding economic development to be elusive. To make matters worse, population 
is increasing most rapidly in those areas which are the poorest, with this population 
growth itself adversely affecting economic development.37 
In 1984 the World Bank issued pessimistic projections of the consequences of 
continued rapid population growth in the Third World: 
[Assuming standard projections,] world population would stabilize around 
the year 2150, having risen from almost 4.8 billion to more than 11 billion. It 
would reach 9.8 billion by the year 2050. The population oftoday's dev:!loped 
countries would grow from about 1.2 billion today to 1.4 billion in 2050, while 
that of those countries now classified as developing would grow from over 3.6 
billion to 8.4 billion. By the time world population stabilized, the population 
of India would be 1.7 billion, making it the most populous nation on Earth. 
Bangladesh, a country about the size of the state of Wisconsin in the United 
States, would have a population of 450 million. Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zaire, and 
Kenya, among the most populous countries in Africa, would have populations 
of 620 million, 230 million, 170 million, and 150 million, respectively. As a 
group, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia - today's poorest countries, with 
the fastest population growth - would account for 50 percent of the world's 
people, compared with 30 percent today.38 
In light of such projections, it is difficult to imagine the means by which the poorest 
of today's developing countries will be able to avoid a "Malthusian" check to further 
population growth. Indeed, today we are witnessing a serious famine in parts of East 
Africa - the area which not coincidentally has the world's poorest people and highest 
birth rates.39 Even the World Bank, which normally eschews pessimism, has observed: 
A pessimist might wonder whether for some countries it is not already too late 
- whether rising unemployment and increasing landlessness will overwhelm 
social and political institutions; whether fragile administrative systems will be 
unable to maintain health programs; whether, in countries that are already 
crowded and still heavily reliant on agriculture, mortality will rise to check 
further population growth.40 
37 Economists generally agree that rapid population growth adversely affects economic devel-
opment. Per capita income does not improve if rising Gross National Product (GNP) is offset by a 
corresponding increase in population. Children enter the world as consumers, not producers, and 
have a predictable effect on families' ability to save. A reduction in the birth rate would thus have a 
beneficial effect on per capita income and savings. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 
105. But see J. SIMON, THE ECONOMICS OF POPULATION GROWTH (1977). Not surprisingly, many 
developing countries have embarked on aggressive policies to reduce fertility. The Peoples Republic 
of China has achieved notable success in reducing its birth rate, which has enabled the country to 
enjoy a remarkable rate of economic growth. However, the strict governmental controls utilized to 
effect its birth control policy are very controversial. For a brief history of the development of Chinese 
birth control policy, see generally C. SUNGLlN, POPULATION AND POPULATION POLICY IN MAINLAND 
CHINA 13-24 (1977). 
38 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 7. 
39 Id. at 218-19, 256-57. 
40 Id. at 7. 
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Leaders in the developed world should therefore not close their minds to the prospect of 
a "Malthusian" situation arising in the next several decades to check further growth in the 
poorest countries of the Third World. 
This unprecedented increase in the Third World's population has had, and will 
continue to have, a dramatic effect on immigration to the United States. The source and 
sheer number of immigrants to this country have changed dramatically in recent years. 
(See Figures (1) and (2) below.) Today's immigrants no longer arrive primarily from 
Europe, but in ever-increasing numbers from Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean. 
The majority of such immigrants are seeking employment, attracted to our shores by the 
wealth depicted by American radio and television programs broadcast overseas and the 
relative poverty and lack of opportunity in their own countries. As long as the population 
of the Third World continues to grow rapidly, there will be an ever-increasing pool of 
would-be immigrants to the United States. 
III. IMMIGRATION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: 1776 TO 1985 
Immigration to the United States was unrestricted until the late nineteenth century. 
The first attempts to control immigration were qualitative in nature, barring criminals, 
prostitutes, illiterates, chronic alcoholics, stow-aways, vagrants, and a host of others. 41 
Rising nativist sentiments led to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,42 which 
was expanded in 1907 to exclude the Japanese as well. 43 
By the early twentieth century, the origin of America's immigrants had shifted 
markedly from the traditional sources in northwestern Europe to eastern and southern 
European countries.44 Lawmakers perceived this change as a threat to America's "Nordic" 
character, and enacted the first quantitative restriction of immigration with the First 
Quota Act of 1921.45 This law established an annual ceiling of 350,000 eastern-
hemisphere immigrants and limited the number of aliens of any nationality entering the 
United States to three percent of foreign-born persons of that nationality already residing 
in the United States in 1910.46 This was followed on May 26, 1924 by the Immigration 
Quota Act,47 an even more restrictive measure. This Act, in conjunction with the Immig-
ration Act of February 5, 1917,48 a qualitative measure, governed American immigration 
policy until 1952. 
The Immigration Quota Act of 1924 fortified the 1921 Act in a variety of ways. The 
quantitative limit was reduced to 164,667 and the annual quota was established at two 
percent of the number of foreign-born persons of each nationality residing in the 
continental United States in 1890.49 This had the effect of favoring immigrants from the 
41 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477, repealed by Act of Oct. 24, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-461, 
88 Stat. 1387; Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214; Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 
1917, Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 874, repealed by Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477 § 403(a)(13), 66 Stat. 279. 
42 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214. 
43 Act of Feb. 20, 1907, 34 Stat. 898. 
44 See supra figure 2. 
45 First Quota Act of 1921, Pub. L. No.5, 42 Stat. 5, repealed by Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477 § 
403(a)( 17), (23), (27), 66 Stat. 279. 
46 Section 2(a). 
47 Immigration Quota Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 139,43 Stat. 153, repealed by Act of June 27, 
1952, ch. 477 § 403(a)(23), (24), 66 Stat. 279. 
48 Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Pub. L. No. 301,39 Stat. 874, repealed by Act of June 27, 
1952, ch. 477 § 403(a)(13), 66 Stat. 279. 
49 Section II (a). 
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traditional sources of su pply even more so than did the 1921 Act. 50 The Act of 1924 also 
introduced the controversial "national origins quota system," which became effective on 
July 1, 1929, following two postponements by joint resolutions of Congress.51 
The 1924 Act accomplished exactly what it was designed to do: curb the total tide of 
'immigration, and restrict immigration from southern and eastern Europe, in particular. 
50 Prior to 1890, ninety-five percent of America's immigrants had come from northwestern 
Europe. E. HARPER, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (1975). 
51 Abrams, American Immigration Policy: How Strait the Gate?, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 107, 
108 n.9 (R. Hofstetter ed. 1984). 
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SOURCES: Bouvier The Impact of Immigration on U,S, Population Size in POPULATION REFERENCE 
BUREAU, INC" POPULATION TRENDS AND PUBLIC POLICY (No, 1) (1981) (data for 1931-
1978); U,S, SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, NEWSLETTER 
No, 14 (1981) (data for 1980), 
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However, immigration from the Western Hemisphere remained free from numerical 
restrictions. When World War I disrupted European immigration, Mexicans flocked to 
jobs in the Southwest, French Canadians to New England, and Cubans and other Carib-
bean Islanders to the Southeast.52 Mexican immigration later became institutionalized 
during the 1940's with the Bracero program, whereby agricultural workers were imported 
from Mexico by executive agreement. 53 
The next major piece of legislation affecting immigration was the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952,54 which Congress passed over President Truman's veto. The Act 
of 1952 (often referred to as the McCarran-Walter Act after its sponsors in the Senate and 
House, respectively) brought the laws which had previously governed immigration and 
naturalization in the United States under one comprehensive statute. Although fre-
quently amended, most radically in 1965, this Act remains the basic immigration law of 
the land. 
The McCarran-Walter Act contained a modified version of the national origins quota 
system, and hence preserved the scheme preferential to northwestern Europeans.55 The 
Act did, however, eliminate race as an absolute bar to immigration and naturalization. 56 
The Act for the first time also awarded the first fifty percent of each country's quota to 
aliens with advanced education or special skills. 57 In addition to this preference scheme, 
Congress empowered the Secretary of Labor to exclude certain aliens whom it deemed to 
be depressing American wages. Thus, the law restricted the entry of unskilled and 
uneducated aliens seeking gainful employment. It also failed to impose any quantitative 
restrictions on Western Hemisphere immigration. 
The McCarran-Walter Act was ineffective in dealing with the large numbers of 
mostly European refugees who began arriving in the United States following World War 
11.58 Accordingly, Congress passed a number of acts59 to admit refugees outside the quota 
restrictions. Between 1952 and 1965, approximately 3,500,000 immigrants were admit-
ted, two-thirds of whom were admitted outside the regular quota system.60 
As the twentieth century progressed and European birth rates fell, the national 
origins quota system became increasingly unworkable. The countries of northern and 
52 Id. at 108. 
53 The ninth proviso of § 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874-76, permitted such 
executive agreements. Executive Order No. 9322, dated March 26, 1943, was given legislative 
sanction by the Act of April 29, 1943,57 Stat. 70. This Act was passed as a result oflabor shortages 
and increased production demands imposed by World War II, and facilitated the importation of 
Mexican agricultural workers by waiving the requirements imposed by §§ 2 and 3 of the Immigration 
Act of February 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 875, and exempting payments made to such workers from 
withholding taxes. The Act also explicitly declined to fix, regulate, or impose minimum wages or 
housing standards, regulate hours of work, or impose or enforce collective bargaining requirements 
or union membership. 
5' Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). 
55 See generally, M. BENNETT, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICIES: A HISTORY (1963). 
58 Sections 201, 202, & 311. 
57 Section 203(a). 
58 Abrams, supra note 51, at 109. 
59 Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336, Pub. L. No. 203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953); Act of Sept. 1957, 
Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639 (1957). In addition, a number of Hungarians were admitted by 
Presidential directives. See generally, Zolberg, The Main Gate and The Back Door: The Politics of American 
Immigration Policy, 1950-1976 (1979) (prepared as a background paper for the Apr. 12, 1978 meeting 
of the Study Group on Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations). 
6. Abrams, supra note 51, at 109. 
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western Europe failed to fill their large quotas, while southern and eastern Europe (and 
later the Third World) found visas in short supplyY By the early 1960's, the national 
origins quota system had also become offensive to America's increasingly liberal attitude 
on race relations. The system was finally abolished by the Immigration Act of 1965,62 
which substituted an elaborate preference scheme of seven categories, designed to unite 
families and admit highly skilled aliens without regard to race, sex, religion, or national 
origin. 
The 1965 Act established an annual limitation of 170,00063 on Eastern Hemisphere 
immigration, not to exceed 20,000 for natives of any single foreign state.64 Prospectively, a 
limit of 120,000 on a first-come first-served basis was established for immigration from 
independent countries of the Western Hemisphere.65 This was the first attempt ever to 
deal with increasing immigration from Latin America.66 Children and spouses of U.S. 
citizens and parents of U.S. citizens at least twenty-one years old were allowed to enter the 
country in unlimited numbers.67 The Act also granted the Secretary of Labor wider 
control over those admitted.68 Aliens not entitled to preference as relatives of U.S. citizens 
were required to obtain certification from the Secretary, asserting that they would not 
displace or "adversely affect the wages or working conditions of workers in the same field 
in the United States."69 Not surprisingly, the bill received the unqualified endorsement of 
organized labor.70 
A slightly modified version of the 1965 Act remains in effect today. Most notably, the 
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 197671 extended the preference system 
to Western Hemisphere countries, and the Act of October 5, 1978,72 combined the 
hemisphere quotas into a single worldwide quota. The Refugee Act of 198073 allowed as 
many as 50,000 refugees to be admitted each year, and permitted the President under 
proper circumstances to increase this number.74 The 1980 Act also reduced the 
worldwide quota from 290,000 to 270,000, but continued the exemption of immediate 
relatives of U.S. citizens from any numerical limitations.75 
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 
Rapidly growing populations in Latin America and elsewhere, coupled with ineffec-
tive enforcement of U.S. immigration law by the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS), contributed to a massive increase in the number of illegal aliens entering the 
61 M. BENNETr, supra note 55, at 212-39. 
62 Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965). 
63 Section 201(a). 
64 Section 202(a). 
65 Section 21(c). 
66 This new measure, which was to become effective on June 30, 1968, was adopted at the behest 
of Sen. Sam Ervin (D-N .C.) and won needed support for the measure from moderates and conserva-
tives. See S. REP. No. 748, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
67 Section 201(a). 
68 Section 212(a). 
69 [d. 
70 See supra note 66. 
71 Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 270 (1976). 
72 Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907 (1978). 
73 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). 
74 Section 201(a)(1). 
75 Section 203(a). 
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United States during the 1970's and early 1980's. Immigration to the United States, both 
legal and illegal, was higher during this period than at any previous time in history,16 with 
the prospect of even further increase. By the early 1980's a consensus had developed that 
an overhaul of U.S. immigration law and policy was needed. 
Still, legislators were bitterly divided as to what, precisely, needed to be done. 
Immigration reform had suddenly become a politically hot issue, with lawmakers scram-
bling to satisfy the often inconsistent desires of their constituents. Liberals and Hispanic 
leaders, by and large, desired to see a relaxation of immigration restrictions. Labor 
leaders generally sought restrictive measures to protect American workers. Conservatives 
and many legislators from the southwestern states desired to see new restrictions placed 
on undocumented aliens. Agricultural interests desired a supply of inexpensive labor. 
Senator Alan K. Simpson (R-Wyo.) and Representative Romano L. Mazzoli (D-Ky.)jointly 
sponsored a bill designed to reform U.S. immigration law. Because of the problems 
inherent in trying to satisfy so many divergent interests, this bill, known as the Simpson-
Mazzoli Bill, has had a tempestuous legislative history. 
The Simpson-Mazzoli Bill was introduced to the Senate as S. 529. After lively debate, 
during which it was amended several times, the bill was passed on May 18, 1983, by a vote 
of 76 to 18.77 Although the bill as amended satisfied a clear majority of the mostly 
conservative, Republican-dominated Senate, it failed to placate both liberals and extreme 
conservatives. Accordingly, Senators Alan Cranston, john East,jesse Helms, and Edward 
Kennedy found themselves allies in opposing the measure.78 
A companion bill was introduced in the House as H.R. 1510, and had a far more 
difficult time due to the sympathy of the House leadership with Hispanic constituents 
opposed to the bill. In 1982 the bill was not placed on the House schedule until it was too 
late to complete floor action.79 In October 1983 the House leadership was able to com-
pletely block House action on the bill.80 The leadership finally relented in 1984, and the 
measure squeaked through the House on june 20, 1984, by a vote of 216 to 211 81 
following a rancorous debate and numerous amendments. 
The House version differed in a number of important respects from the Senate's, 
and was the more "liberal" of the two. House Democrats and Republicans were divided on 
the bill, although the majority of Republicans supported it while a very slight majority of 
the Democrats voted against it.82 Members of the southwestern border states, much 
disturbed by the bill's amnesty provision,83 voted overwhelmingly against the bill.84 
On September 6, House Speaker Thomas P. ("Tip") O'Neill appointed twenty-nine 
conferees, including Edward R. Roybal (D-Cal.), who had led Hispanic opposition to the 
bill.85 (The House group was unusually large because four committees - judiciary, 
Agriculture, Education and Labor, and Energy and Commerce - worked on the bill.)88 
The House conferees met with seven Senate conferees on September 13 to negotiate a 
76 Smith, Introduction to U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 3, 3 (R. Hofstetter ed. 1984). 
77 S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONGo REC. 56905 (1983). 
78Id. 
79 Cohadas, Immigration Reform Measure Nearing Final Vote in House, 42 CONGo Q. 1408 (1984). 
8°Id. 
81 Cohadas, House Passes Immigration Bill by Five Votes, 42 CONGo Q. 1493 (1984). 
82 Id. 
83 See infra text accompanying notes 88-94. 
84 Id. at 1494. 
85 Cohadas, Immigration Bill Conference to Begin, 42 CONGo Q. 2223 (1984). 
86Id. 
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compromise, hopeful that they would complete the revision in time for final action before 
the scheduled October 5 adjournment of Congress.87 Given the diversity of interests 
represented in the committee, a threatened filibuster, and the fact that elections were 
rapidly approaching, the conferees were unable to reach a compromise. 
As of this writing, immigration reform is in legi~lative limbo. One may only speculate 
that some form of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill will be re-introduced in the 99th Congress. 
The remainder of this section will focus on the more controversial provisions of the bill, 
which will likely be incorporated into a new measure which will come before Congress. 
(For the sake of brevity, the author has refrained from cataloging all measures adopted by 
the Senate and House.) 
Amnesty. The most controversial provision ofthe Simpson-Mazzoli Bill was its grant of 
amnesty to aliens who entered the United States illegally before certain cut-off dates and 
have since resided here continuously. The Senate bill had a two-tiered approach, allowing 
the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant permanent-resident status88 to aliens who 
can establish that they arrived in the country before January 1, 1977,89 and temporary-
resident status for those who can establish that they arrived before January 1, 1980.90 
The House version of the amnesty provision was far more generous than that of the 
Senate, authorizing the Attorney General in his discretion to grant temporary-resident 
status to illegal aliens who could establish that they arrived in the United States prior to 
January 1, 1982, and had since resided here continuously.91 The House version further 
authorized the Attorney General to upgrade the temporary-resident status to 
permanent-resident status for aliens who could establish that they had acquired, or were 
acquiring, a minimal understanding of ordinary English and a knowledge and under-
standing of the history and government of the United States.92 Both the Senate and 
House versions also barred all legalized aliens from receiving federally funded public 
assistance for a certain period of time,93 and provided for a federal grant or reimburse-
ment to the states for the expenses of amnesty.94 
Employer Sanctions. Another controversial provision of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill in-
volved the imposition of penalties against employers who knowingly hired illegal aliens. 
This provision promised to be the most effective measure yet devised for dealing with the 
problem of illegal immigration, since the vast majority of illegal aliens arrive in this 
country for the purpose of seeking gainful employment.95 The measure was adopted over 
87 Cohadas, supra note 3, at 2275. 
88 A permanent resident enjoys virtually all the rights of citizenship, with the exception of the 
right to vote or hold public or military office. Current U.S. law allows a permanent resident to seek 
U.S. citizenship after five years. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1427 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985). 
89 S. 529, supra note 1, at § 301. 
90 [d. A temporary resident is admitted for lawful residence for a limited period of time, the 
duration of which is established by the appropriate visa category. Examples of temporary residents 
are: tourists (B-2 category), students (F category), and businessmen (B-1 category). Th~ duration of 
stay may often be extended. The Senate version of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill proposed to grant 
temporary resident status to those aliens who arrived in the United States after January 1, 1977 but 
before Jan~ary 1, 1980. This temporary status was to automatically terminate 3 112 years after such 
status was to be granted, unless the alien had filed an application for adjustment to permanent 
resident status and such application had not been denied. 
9' H.R. 1510, supra note 2, at § 301. 
92 [d. 
93 [d.; S. 529, supra note 1, at § 301. 
94 S. 529, supra note 1, at § 302; H.R. 1510, supra note 2, at § 304. 
95 Smith, supra note 76, at 3-4. 
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the vociferous OpposItIon of Hispanic groups,96 who perceived it as a threat to their 
growing political influence, and civil rights groups, who were concerned with the possibil-
ity of institutionalized discrimination.97 
Both the Senate98 and House99 versions prohibited the knowing employment of 
illegal immigrants in American jobs. However, while the Senate version subjected all 
violators to penalties, the House version subjected first-time violators to only a warning; 
only those employers who had been previously warned would be subjected to penalties. 
(Since the INS is only able to visit a very small number of all U.S. employers annually, the 
House version effectively precluded the use of penalties.) Both versions also required all 
employers with four or more employees to check each new employee to determine 
whether he or she is eligible for employment. loo 
Guestworkers. Western growers have much at stake with immigration reform. The 
Simpson-Mazzoli Bill attempted to stop the flow of undocumented workers into the 
country by penalizing employers who knowingly hire them.101 Many such growers have 
come to depend upon a supply of cheap, often illegal, labor for harvesting crops. As a 
result, both the Senate and House versions of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill codified a special 
version of the existing "H-2" temporary foreign-worker program for agriculture. lo2 The 
House version, however, was far more generous to the farming interests. Language 
inserted by the House Judiciary committee, for example, required warrants for "open-
field" searches,103 an apparent attempt to overrule the recent Supreme Court case of 
Oliver v. United States. 104 In addition, the House adopted a new open-ended "guestworker" 
program which would have allowed some half million workers to enter the United States 
for up to eleven months to harvest perishable goods. lo5 Opponents saw the guestworker 
program as a revival of the now infamous Bracero program, and Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez 
96 Cohadas, supra note 79, at 1410. 
97 S. 529, supra note 1, at § 101(a)(3); H.R. 1510, supra note 2, at § 101(a)(3). Civil rights groups 
have complained that the employer-sanction provisions will deter employers from hiring employees 
who are non-white or who have foreign-sounding names or accents. Both versions of the Simpson-
Mazzoli Bill minimize this possibility by requiring employers to only establish that they have complied 
in "good faith" with the identification requirements of that section. An employer who checks the 
simple documentation identified in the bill would be immune from penalty. An employer who 
persists in refusing employment to a non-white or foreign-sounding applicant after having been 
furnished such documentation would be behaving unreasonably. 
98 S. 529, supra note 1, at § 101. 
99 H.R. 1510, supra note 2, at § 101. 
100 Id.; S. 529, supra note 1, at § 10 1. 
101 H.R. 1510, supra note 2, at § 101; S. 529, supra note 1, at § 101. 
102 S. 529, supra note 1, at § 211; H.R. 1510, supra note 2, at § 211. 
103 S. 529, supra note 1, at § 101; H.R. 1510, supra note 2, at § 101. 
104 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984). The Oliver case involved a constitutional challenge to the search of a 
field of marijuana plants. By a vote of 6-3 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule announced in 
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924), that special protection accorded by the fourth 
amendment to the people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects is not extended to open fields. 
Hester has been the basis of INS searches of farms and has long been opposed by agricultural 
interests, civil libertarians, and Hispanics. Cohadas, Rulings May Affect Immigration Debate, 42 CONGo 
Q. 946 (1984). In a second case, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 
(1984), the Supreme Court by a 7-2 margin upheld the legality of "factory surveys" based upon 
warrants with only general information. Read together, Oliver and Delgado express a willingness by 
the Court to interpret the fourth amendment more narrowly, in favor of the INS and other law 
enforcement agencies. 
105 S. 529, supra note I, at § 101; H.R. 1510, supra note 2, at § 101. 
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(D-Tex.) bitterly remarked that it amounted to "rent a slave.',,06 Adoption of the 
guestworker program also led to the withdrawal of support for the bill by organized 
labor. 107 
Miscellaneous Provisions. The Senate and House versions of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill 
contained a large number of less controversial measures. For the sake of brevity, this 
section will refer to only a portion of them. 
The Senate version established a ceiling on legal admissions of 425,000 per year,'OS 
exclusive of refugees. The House version contained no similar overall limitation, but did 
increase the quotas for both Mexican and Canadian immigrants from 20,000 to 40,000 
annually.109 Both versions simplified and streamlined the procedures for adjudication, 
asylum and judicial review,"° made passing reference to the need for improved enforce-
ment of immigration laws, and called for an increase in appropriations to fund the INS."1 
Finally, both versions imposed strict penalties against the transport of illegal aliens to the 
United States,112 and the use, sale, or manufacture of counterfeit or altered identification 
documents. '13 
V. ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 
A. The Domestic Impact of Immigration 
It is clear that the United States cannot absorb all would-be immigrants from the 
Third World. The sheer numbers alone dwarf our capacity to absorb all of them. Demand 
for immigrant visas will exceed supply for the foreseeable future, no matter which policy 
is eventually adopted. America simply cannot serve as a demographic escape valve for all 
of today's transitional countries as it did for Europe in the nineteenth century. There 
appears to be a consensus among American lawmakers to this effect. However, there is 
much disagreement as to how this policy should be implemented. 
It is unquestionably the right of every sovereign nation to exclude unwanted people 
from its borders. The United States may establish any standard it desires, however 
arbitrary, for admitting new immigrants. However, although America has the power and 
authority to adopt draconian measures to deal with the immigration problem, it is 
unlikely to do so. Legislators will attempt to fashion an immigration policy which com-
ports with America's sense of justice and equality, as well as its historic role as a land of 
opportunity for people of all backgrounds. Within this context, lawmakers must satisfy 
constituent special interest groups while attempting to serve the national interest. The 
task is not an easy one. 
It would be utterly xenophobic to assume that no one outside of our borders is 
capable of contributing to our science, art, technology, or economy. However, "optimum" 
immigration rates must be established after carefully considering its effect on domestic 
unemployment, economic growth, environment, and social and political well-being. For 
example, it behooves policy makers to consider the effect of immigration on U.S. popula-
106 Cohadas, supra note 79, at 42. 
107 S. 529, supra note 1, at § 101; H.R. 1510, supra note 2, at § 101. 
10" S. 529, supra note 1, at § 20 l. 
109 H.R. 1510, supra note 2, at § 20l. 
110 S. 529, supra note 1, at §§ 121-26; H.R. 1510, supra note 2, at §§ 121-26. 
111 S. 529, supra note 1, at §§ 111 & 402; H.R. 1510, supra note 2, at §§ 111 & 120. 
112 S. 529, supra note 1, at § 112; H.R. 1510, supra note 2, at § 112. 
113 S. 529, supra note 1, at § 102; H.R. 1510, supra note 2, at § 102. 
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tion size and compositIOn. At first glance, the addition of one or even two million 
additional faces per year in a population of more than 230,000,000 does not seem to be 
statistically significant. However, the cumulative effect of such immigration is astonishing. 
Immigration (both legal and illegal) now accounts for about half of the nation's popula-
tion growth,1I4 and high fertility among recent arrivals accounts for a substantial portion 
of the rest. 115 Although a "Malthusian" check to further increase in America's population 
is not a prospect in the foreseeable future, the power of such continued growth should 
not be underestimated. 
Figure 3 below contains a number of projections of U.S. population size, given 
various assumptions on the level of immigration. The cumulative demographic effect of 
such immigration is well illustrated. 
Such a dramatic increase in the country's population will tax the nation's housing, 
social services, schools, economic infrastructure, and environment. It will also have 
dramatic socio-demographic impacts: for instance, if present trends continue, whites will 
become a minority in America sometime between the years 2025 and 2050. 
America has historically been denoted a "melting pot" of various European nation-
alities. Americans take pride in being an amalgamation of people from elsewhere. During 
the years of greatest European immigration, however, nativist sentiments in this country 
ran deep. Indeed, the first quantitative restrictions on immigration to the United States 
consisted of an attempt to preserve the ethnic makeup of the nation's white population.1I6 
Time, assimilation, and intermarriage among the various European nationalities 
have reduced such nativist feelings. Many proponents of open-door immigration during 
this century maintain that Latin Americans, Haitians, Cubans, Vietnamese, Filipinos, 
Indians, Arabs, Africans, and Hmong tribesmen can be forged into Americans in a 
similar manner. However, this view fails to account for the fact that numerous non-
Europeans must be absorbed into a culture that is fundamentally European - a task 
more formidable than that which faced the Irish who settled in Boston or the Germans 
who settled in Milwaukee. Even if cultural assimilation is successful, racial differences will 
persist, as well as the ugly prospect of racial discrimination. 
Consider the experience of the American black. Notwithstanding the existence of 
well-intentioned legislation and social programs designed to foster greater economic and 
social assimilation (i.e., "integration"), blacks as a group lag behind whites in virtually all 
indices of economic and social well-being. In effect blacks remain a sub-culture (some 
would say sub-class) in America. 117 One should query whether today's immigrants will fare 
any better than this Third World population which is already residing here. 
The cause of the Third World's demographic malaise is, of course, economic under-
development. There would be no need to police our borders if the rest of the world had 
reached demographic stability through economic prosperity. We are, in fact, directly 
affected by the quality oflife on the other side of the "Golden Door." Immigration debate 
should therefore not be confined to enforcement issues; policymakers should also explore 
the means by which we can foster economic development abroad. 
114 Smith, supra note 76, at 3. 
115 See generally D. SPAIN, THE UNITED STATES: JUST THE FACTS (1983). 
116 See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text. 
117 See generally Bronfenbrenner, Hyphenated Americans, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 9, 17-25 (R. 
Hofstetter ed. 1984). 
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REFERENCE BUREAU, INC., POPULATION TRENDS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1981) (total fertility 
rate 2.0). 
B. The Need For Developmental Aid 
Just as the United States cannot absorb more than a tiny fraction of would-be 
immigrants to this country, it cannot single-handedly undertake the economic develop-
ment of the Third World. This should not suggest, however, that any effort to extend 
economic aid to the Third World is futile. Properly focused economic assistance can 
indeed accelerate economic progress. 
If such aid is concentrated on those countries from which the largest numbers of 
immigrants presently arrive (e.g., Mexico) it is possible that the flow of immigration from 
such countries could be substantially reduced. In an earlier article this author discussed 
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one possible means by which such a program of developmental aid could be im-
plemented. lIM 
Relatively high wages in this country and the integration of the world's economy have 
contributed to the gradual shift from a manufacturing to a service-oriented economy. 
American labor-intensive manufacturers frequently encounter stiff competition from 
enterprises in developing countries, where the lower prevailing wages give certain indus-
tries a competitive advantage. In order to become competitive, U.S. manufacturers must 
obtain either wage concessions from their employees or a public subsidy through import 
restrictions. Neither alternative is particularly attractive. 
Such enterprises could also become competitive by relocating their manufacturing 
operations to a low-wage country such as Mexico, and export the goods back to the United 
States and elsewhere. The relocation of an internationally competitive industry to Mexico 
would be a bonanza to the Mexican economy, and the American consumer, meanwhile, 
would enjoy lower cost goods. The pressure to migrate to the United States would also 
diminish as Mexicans find suitable employment closer to home. American immigration 
policymakers should thus encourage the relocation of non-competitive labor-intensive 
manufacturing industries to the major sending countries. 119 
C. Enforcement: Employer Sanctions 
There is perhaps no place on earth where the First World meets the Third World 
more abruptly than at the U.S./Mexican border. The authors of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill 
correctly recognized that most immigrants are attracted to this country by the prospect of 
employment at relatively high wage rates. Indeed, the U.S. minimum wage currently 
exceeds prevailing wage rates in Mexico by three or four hundred percent. The imposi-
tion of penalties against employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens is a fresh new 
approach to enforcement of immigration law. If the penalty provisions are not too diluted 
by the conferees, it should help stem the tide of illegal immigration. 
The late Professor William P. Travis observed that the U.S. minimum wage is 
simultaneously too high and too low. 120 It is high enough to attract millions of un-
documented workers and discourage the formation of new jobs (the decline of the 
full-service gas station in America can be blamed at least in part on the existence of a 
"high" minimum wage). At the same time, the minimum wage is too low to attract 
sufficient numbers of American workers to what are perceived as undesirable jobs. Thus, 
we have the incongruous situation whereby millions of illegal aliens arrive to claim jobs at 
or below the U.S. minimum wage, under conditions of relatively high domestic unem-
ployment. 
To remedy the situation, Professor Travis proposed a government subsidy of the 
wages of American citizens in traditionally low-paying jobs,121 whereby the employer 
would pay less, and the employee receive more, than the stated minimum wage. A 
subsidy, he argued, would reduce unemployment by making work an economically 
118 Hofstetter, supra note 31, at 65-77. 
119 The United States can assist the relocation of American manufacturers by a variety of means: 
it can provide low-cost loans or loan guarantees, technicaVmanagerial assistance, and cut red tape. 
U.S. policy currently favors foreign investment. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC), for example, provides insurance for U.S. private investment overseas. 
120 Travis, Migration, Income Distribution, and Welfare Under Alternative International Economic 
Policies, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 81, 81-106 (R. Hofstetter ed. 1984). 
121 Id. at 106. 
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attractive alternative to welfare, and reduce illegal immigration as Americans flock to 
traditionally shunned jobs. Travis calculated that the benefits of reduced unemployment, 
transfer payments and immigration would greatly exceed the cost of such a subsidy.122 
The employer-sanction provision of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill could be greatly 
strengthened by the addition of a wage subsidy. Illegal aliens would be less inclined to 
immigrate if fewer jobs awaited them in car washes, hotels, and kitchens. Congress should 
carefully consider Professor Travis' proposal. 123 
D. Amnesty 
The amnesty provision of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill is an attempt to deal with the 
thorny issue of illegal immigrants already residing in this country.124 The actual number 
of illegal aliens residing in the United States is hotly disputed. 125 Nevertheless, all experts 
seem to agree that the numbers are increasing very rapidly. (See Figure 4 below.) 
Available data suggests that our "Spanish origin" population increased by 61 percent 
between 1970 and 1980,126 which should indicate the magnitude of growth of the illegal 
alien population. Accordingly, the cut-off date selected by Congress will have a consider-
able impact on the number of aliens who are granted amnesty. 
The prospect of forcibly expelling millions of illegal immigrants who have resided 
here for years is anathema to most Americans. Critics of the amnesty provision complain, 
however, that amnesty rewards lawbreakers, encourages others to do the same, and robs 
U.S. citizens of employment. 127 The legalization issue is further complicated by the fact 
that the United States is one of the few countries in the world that automatically grants 
citizenship to anyone born within its borders.128 The extremely high birth rate among 
illegal aliens in the United States is well-known. 129 The fact that the parents of such 
youngsters reside here illegally does not prevent them from enjoying all of the benefits of 
American citizenship. Consequently, a forced expulsion of illegal aliens from the country 
would impose tremendous personal hardship on many of their children who are now 
citizens of the United States. Delays in confronting the problem have obviously made 
matters worse. 
The Simpson-Mazzoli Bill attempts to mitigate the cost of amnesty by barring illegal 
122 [d. Prof. Travis was hardly a proponent of generous social programs. He was therefore quite 
surprised by the results of his computer analysis, which indicated that the benefits of a wage subsidy 
would greatly exceed costs. Fiscal conservatives should be attracted by his proposal. 
123 A wage subsidy should obviously be limited to those jobs thought of as undesirable, and, 
hence, regularly filled by illegal aliens. Initially, the wage subsidy program could also be limited to 
those states which border Mexico. The author recognizes that there will be problems in locating and 
defining jobs which merit a wage subsidy, but such problems may be overcome with thought and 
careful planning. 
124 It is worthy to note that there would be no such problem if the INS had been adequately 
funded during the 1970's so as to enable it to effectively enforce existing immigration law. This 
experience should dispel any doubt as to the cost-effectiveness of amounts expended on enforce-
ment. See infra note 130. 
125 See Corwin, The Numbers Game: Estimates of Illegal Aliens in the United States, 1970-1981, in U.S. 
IMMIGRATION POLICY 223, 223-97 (R. Hofstetter ed. 1984) . 
. 126 D. SPAIN, supra note 115, at 2. See generally Corwin, supra note 125, at 223-97. 
127 Cohadas, supra note 81, at 1494. 
128 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
129 Sehgal and Vialet, Documenting the Undocumented: Data, Like Aliens, Are Elusive, 103 MONTHLY 
LAB. REv. 18, 18-21 (1980). 
1985] 
LOW 
IMMIGRATION REFORM 
FIGURE 4 
Conjectural Estimates of Illegal Aliens Settled in the 
United States in 1981 
HIGH 
115 
5,400,000 6,790,000 MEXICAN. Mc.tly unskilled and leI1li-alUlIed workers. male 
and female, who, becaUle of border proximity, have on the 
averase poaibly ~ to 7~ family dependents in the 
boUIehold, including many U.S. born children. 
Rough breakdown: California, 2.5-3.0 million; Texas 2.0-2.5 
million; Illinois, 250,000-350,000; Colorado, 150,000-200,000; 
Arizona, 90,000-100,000; New Mexico, 60,000-90,000; other 
states, 400,000-500,000. 
400,000 530,000 CARIBBEAN. Mainly unskilled workers and family dependents 
390,000 
270,000 
440,000 
250,000 
who commonly live near black and Puerto Rican populations, 
as in New York City, Newark, Miami, and Wuhington, D.C. 
Abo includes many middle- and upper-c:lua expatriate families, 
many with profeuional training. 
Rough breakdown: Dominicans, 140,000 to 180,000; Haitians, 
150,000-200,000; Jamaicans, 80,000-100,000; plus 30,000-50,000 
Trinidadians, Tobagans, Barbadians, and others, lOme of them 
in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Pueno Rico. 
500,000 CENTRAL AMERICAN. Mc.tly in Hispanic area of La. 
Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Chicago, Miami, Houston, 
and Wuhington, D.C., employed as common labor and 
domestics. But includes many Itudent overstays, and tens of 
thousands of quasi-political and "economic" refugees from all 
lOCial cluses, mainly Salvadorans and Nicaraguans, of the latter 
IeVaaI thousand have been granted asylum. 
Rough breadown: Salvadorans, 200,000-230,000; Guatemalans, 
70,000-110,000; Panamanians, 60,000-70,000; Nicaraguans, 
40,000-50,000; other, 20,000-30,000. 
380,000 SOtrrH AMERICAN. Mostly in metropolitan cities like New 
York, Miami, San Francisco, La. Angeles, Miami, Houston, 
Clicago, and Wuhington, D.C. Includes a mix of overstay 
students and visiton, profesaionals, expatriates, drug traffickers, 
as from Colombia, and common Iaboren. 
Rough breakdown: Colombians, 100,000-120,000, Argentinians, 
40,000-60,000, Ecuadorans, 30,000-50,000; Peruvians, 20,000-
30,000; other, 80,000-100,000. 
540,000 ASIAN. Principally in UChina towns," as in La. Angeles, San 
Francisco Bay area, or New York City. Includes many oventay 
students and trainees, as well as numerous relatives who labor 
in small family-run shops and restaurants or in nearby garment 
"sweat 1hopI." 
Rough breakdown: Chinese-Taiwanese, 300,000-350,000; 
Koreans, 40,000-60,000; Southeast Asians, 80,000-100,000; 
Japanae, 20,000-30,000. 
300,000 flUPINO. Mainly in California and Hawaii as unskilled and 
leIIliskilled labor, but abo includes many overstay Itudenu, 
viliton. traiDee profaIionals, relatives, and expatriates of alllOc:ial 
..... 
SOURCE: Corwin, The Numbers Game 248 in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY (R. Hofstetter ed. 1984). 
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aliens seeking temporary or permanent resident status (as the case may be) from most 
forms of public assistance. 13o This particular provision also reflects some desire among 
lawmakers to penalize illegal aliens for their wrongdoing. Such a "penalty" may indeed be 
a small price to pay for acquiring legal residence in the United States. 
There was little discussion among lawmakers and commentators of proposed re-
quirements that all aliens seeking amnesty file delinquent tax returns and pay overdue 
taxes and penalties on wages earned in the United States during their illegal residency. 
The Internal Revenue Code makes no distinction between legal and illegal residents; both 
are subject to taxation on U.S. sourced income.131 A substantial number of illegal aliens 
earn wages "off the books" and have never filed income tax returns. 
Although the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill contains no specific provision requiring aliens 
seeking amnesty to file delinquent income tax returns, one would expect the Internal 
Revenue Service to be attentive to aliens applying for amnesty. Rep. Kent Hance has 
argued that few aliens will try to gain legal status for fear of assessment for back taxes. 132 
Fairness dictates that such aliens be subjected to U.S. taxation as a condition of legal 
residency, even though the enforcement of such a requirement would admittedly be 
difficult. Regardless, serious consideration should be given to requiring illegal aliens to 
file delinquent returns and pay delinquent taxes and penalties as a condition of amnesty. 
E. Guestworkers 
The guestworker program established by the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill was a response to 
western agricultural interests in need of cheap migrant labor. An open-ended 
guestworker program was passed by the House against the recommendation of the Select 
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP)133 and over the opposition of 
organized labor ,134 Hispanic organizations and civil rights groups.135 A recent articlel36 
observed that employers who rely on undocumented workers are not in the mainstream 
of American business, and concluded that immigration is not an important economic 
issue for most American businesses. On this basis, one could conclude that only those 
agricultural interests that lobbied extensively for the guestworker provision stand to gain 
by its passage. 
The experience of the European guestworker programs may be illustrative of the 
problems which may confront a new Bracero-type program. 137 During the 1960's, years of 
chronic labor shortage in Europe, European employers lobbied for the right to employ 
temporary foreign workers to fill industrial jobs. Not surprisingly, such "temporary" 
workers sought every available means to remain, and employers were anxious to minimize 
training costs and worker turnover. The guestworkers were soon followed by their 
130 Cohadas, supra note 81, at 1494. Rep. Dan Lungren (R-Cal.) estimated that the House's 
version of the amnesty provision would nevertheless cost $6.6 billion between 1985 and 1989. Id. 
131 Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (as amended), 26 U.S.C. §§ 861-79 (1982). 
13. Opponents Vow to Defeat Immigration Compromise Bill, Indianapolis Star, Sept. 19, 1984, at 11, 
col. 1. 
133 STAFF OF SELECT COMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., FINAL REpORT: U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 45 
(Comm. Print 1981). • 
13' S. 529, supra note I, at § 101; H.R. 1510, supra note 2, at § 101. 
13s Cohadas, supra note 79, at 1408. 
136 Hector, The Non-Issue of Immigration, FORTUNE, July 23, 1984, at 91. 
131 See generally Martin and Houstoun, European and American Immigration Policies 29, 29-54, in 
U.S. IMMIGRATION (R. Hofstetter ed. 1984). 
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dependents. Economic growth has since slowed, and the guestworkers now draw dispro-
portionately upon the social programs they once subsidized. Today large numbers of 
nationals from Turkey, Algeria, and other underdeveloped countries inhabit American-
style ghettos in the larger cities of western Europe. Philip L. Martin and Marion F. 
Houstoun have observed: 
The guestworker compromise, so appealing in its simplicity, failed in Europe 
because its industrial democracies were not prepared to treat alien labor as a 
commodity or to break the bonds that tie migrants to their employers. The 
longer migrants remained, the more likely they were to have obtained rights 
to stay and to have their dependents join them. Since few nations proscribe 
family reunification, the immigration of workers resulted in still more immig-
ration. 13B 
In short, the guestworker programs failed in Europe because policy makers neglected to 
anticipate all of the likely costs and problems generated by such programs. Europeans 
expected a cost-free subsidy of their industries, and instead received a growing Third 
World population which survives on such countries' generous social programs. 
Unemployment in the United States in recent years has hovered between seven and 
ten percent. There are plenty of American workers available to pick tomatoes, providing 
the growers offer prevailing American wages and benefits. If tomatoes are too labor-
intensive to be profitably grown in the United States, then perhaps the American con-
sumer should buy Mexican tomatoes, and U.S. growers should plant crops that can be 
harvested by machines. In view of the failures of guestworker programs in the past, 
lawmakers should have been cognizant of the fact that such programs inevitably lead to a 
public subsidy of the interests employing such workers. The guestworker program should 
be excised from the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Immigration to the United States is at an all-time high. The number of immigrants 
aspiring to reach the "Golden Door" will increase even further so long as Third World 
population growth remains unchecked. The current level of immigration exceeds that 
which will serve the national interest. Therefore, steps should be taken immediately to 
deal with the situation. 
Immigration reform is a politically sensitive issue involving many competing inter-
ests. The Simpson-Mazzoli Bill addresses a number of serious problems, and in its present 
form is unquestionably an improvement over the prevailing chaos. Time will tell whether 
lawmakers will agree on a compromise measure. 
Immigration reform should focus upon developmental aid to the major sending 
countries as well as enforcement of applicable laws. The Simpson-Mazzoli Bill per se does 
not adopt the former approach. However, legislation fostering economic development 
abroad may be subsequently passed by Congress in some form other than immigration 
reform. 
The Simpson-Mazzoli Bill imposes sanctions upon employers who knowingly hire 
illegal aliens, and, if adequately enforced, promises to be a highly effective means of 
controlling illegal immigration. This provision could be strengthened with the adoption 
138 Id. at 54. 
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of a wage subsidy. Such a wage subsidy would most likely appear as an amendment to the 
minimum-wage law, rather than as a specific immigration measure. 
The granting of amnesty is a pragmatic means of dealing with America's increasing 
population of illegal aliens, the product of years of lax enforcement by the INS. The 
prospect of rewarding intentional lawbreakers with U.S. residency and, ultimately, U.S. 
citizenship, is offensive without some quid pro quo. Accordingly, the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill 
should mandate the filing of delinquent income tax returns by illegal aliens seeking 
amnesty. 
The guestworker program is an unworkable and expensive public subsidy of agricul-
tural interests, and hence should be excised from the bill. Foreign workers obviously need 
not be imported specifically for American jobs so long as domestic unemployment re-
mains high. Agricultural lobbyists complain that a scarcity of manpower in the United 
States prevents the harvesting of perishable crops. This "problem" would quickly disap-
pear if the growers were to offer prevailing American wages and benefits. 
The Simpson-Mazzoli Bill cannot affect the demographic and economic factors 
which underlie immigration. One cannot legislate the disappearance of a global problem. 
Immigration will therefore remain an intractable enforcement problem for years to come. 
Even if the bill is finally adopted, lawmakers must continue to be apprised of the 
complexity of the immigration problem and be prepared to deal with it in a comprehen-
sive fashion. 
